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Abstract
We consider learning by fictitious play in a large population of agents engaged
in single-play, two-person rounds of a symmetric game, and derive a mean-filed
type model for the corresponding stochastic process. Using this model, we de-
scribe qualitative properties of the learning process and discuss its asymptotic
behavior. Of the special interest is the comparative characteristics of the fictitious
play learning with and without a memory factor. As a part of the analysis, we
show that the model leads to the continuous, best-response dynamics equation of
Gilboa and Matsui (1991), when all agents have similar empirical probabilities.
Keywords: Fictitious play, best response dynamics, learning in large populations
1. Introduction
Learning theories concern with the rules by which players can discover opti-
mal strategies in repeated plays of games, typically, when the players act in self-
interest, in the absence of the complete information about the game, and having
limited ability to communicate with other players.
In the learning by fictitious play (FP) one assumes that players keep the statis-
tics of their opponent’s actions over the whole history of the process and compute
empirical probabilities for actions played, as if playing against stationary envi-
ronment. Given the game payoffs, agents’ actions are the best responses to their
assessment of opponents. A number of sufficient conditions for convergence of
the empirical probabilities to Nash equilibria was established by Robinson (1951),
Miyasawa (1961), Nachbar (1990), Krishna & Sjostrom (1995).
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Fictitious play learning, however, need not to converge, as shown by an exam-
ple of Shapley (1964), in which empirical probabilities follow a cycle. This type
of behavior was discussed in greater details by Gilboa & Matsui (1991), Gauners-
dorfer & Hofbauer (1995), Monderer et al. (1997), and Benaim, Hofbauer &
Hopkins (2009).
The convergence of empirical probabilities, even if it does take place, does not
tell the whole story of learning. Equally important is to know what actions are se-
lected by the payers in the course of learning. An example of Fudenberg & Kreps
(1993), for the game in Table 1, shows that the process can go through the cor-
related play of (L,L), (R,R), (L,L), (R,R)..., with players realizing zero payoffs,
rather than positive payoff of the Nash equilibrium. A variant of fictitious play,
called stochastic fictitious play, was introduced by Fudenberg & Kreps (1993),
following the idea of Harsanyi’s (1973), to provide a reasonable learning model
in which players choose mixed strategies as their best responses. The convergence
of stochastic FP in 2x2 games in various situations was established by Fudenberg
& Kreps (1993), Benaim & Hirsch (1996) and Kanoivski & Young (1995).
There are different scenarios for learning to evolve in a population of agents
depending on available information and how plays are arranged between agents.
One of the scenarios, which we adopt in this paper, is to consider sequential plays
between pairs of randomly selected agents, and keep the outcomes of the games
private. To describe learning in such processes, Gilboa & Matsui (1991) proposed
the continuous, ODE model for the change of the distribution of players on a set
of pure strategies. A similar equation was used by Fudenberg & Levine (1998) to
describe the changes in population average subjective probabilities.
The equation holds under conditions that the number of players is large, and
only small number of players are adjusting their play to the best response of the
population average during short time periods. It is also implicitly assumed that all
players in the population have nearly similar vector of empirical probabilities at
all times and the best response function is evaluated at that vector.
The equation, known as the best response dynamics (BRD) equation, became
popular model for studying FP learning in large populations, and its asymptotic
properties were discussed by Hofbauer & Sigmund (1998), Gaunersdorfer & Hof-
bauer (1995), Benaim, Hofbauer & Hopkins (2009).
In this paper we would like to obtain a refinement of the BRD equation by
considering the changes in the probability density function for the distribution of
agents in the space of empirical priors, rather than postulating equations for its
moments.
The mean-field model, that we obtain, contains significantly more information
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L R
L (0, 0) (1, 1)
R (1, 1) (0, 0)
Table 1: Persistent miscoordination game from Fudenberg & Kreps (1993).
about the state of the learning. It shows the whole spectrum of empirical priors in
the population, and indicates how learning affects agents with different subjective
probabilities.
We follow the approach, based on Fokker-Planck equation, is classical in
many-agents systems in physics, biology, and social sciences. It applies to sys-
tems in the state of “chaos” when states of the learning of two randomly selected
agents are independent (or nearly independent). This condition is reasonable in
large populations where the same pair of agents is rarely selected for the play. At
the same time, it excludes any type of correlation (coordination) between players.
Two models of fictitious play are considered in this paper: the classical FP and
FP with a memory factor. The latter model places higher weights to more recent
observations, compared to equally weighted classical model. Memory factor mod-
els have been used in the context of reinforced learning by Harley (1981), Erev
& Roth (1998), Roth & Erev (1995) and in fictitious play learning by Benaim,
Hofbauer & Hopkins (2009).
The paper organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model and the
PDE equations that serve as an approximation of the learning process. The deriva-
tion of the equations from many-particle stochastic process is presented in Ap-
pendix. Section 2.2 compares the dynamics of the stochastic learning and the
corresponding dynamics from the deterministic PDE model, on the example of
the 2x2 miscoordination game from Table 1. In section 2.3 we explain how BRD
equation is obtained from the PDE model, and in sections 2.4 and 2.4 consider
the learning dynamics obtained from the PDE model for learning in games with
a single Nash equilibrium. In section 2.6 we return to the example of the misco-
ordination game of Fudenberg & Kreps (1993), and using the PDE model as the
predictor for the evolution of learning, we show that both, mean subjective prob-
abilities and mean best response probabilities, converge to the Nash equilibrium.
Thus, in large populations, in roughly half of the plays each agent gets a positive
payoff.
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2. The Model
We consider a series of plays of a symmetric 2-player game between randomly
selected agents in a large population. Denote the set of pure strategies in the
game by {si}, i = 1..n. Each agent k maintains a record (S
t
1,k, ..,S
t
n,k) of times her
opponents played (s1, ..,sn) up to the epoch t.
Agent k is using this vector as a prior for the probability
Sti,k
∑ j S
t
j,k
for action j to be played next time by her opponent, and selects her action as a
best response. In the classical fictitious play the best response is a multi-valued
function. For definiteness we assume that there is a rule by which agent k decided
between equivalent actions. This will not enter in the equations for the averaged
dynamics, as long as the situation is non-generic: the set of strategies for which the
best response is multi-valued is of measure zero. The latter condition is assumed
in the paper.
After the play, agent k updates her empirical priors by the rule
St+1i,k = (1−µh)S
t
i,k + Ii,k, i = 1..n, (1)
where Ii,k = h if the opponent played si, and zero otherwise. The learning incre-
ment h can be any positive number, without altering large time learning process. A
positive parameter (µh) ∈ [0,1] is the memory factor. Leaning starts with agents
having initial priors (S01,k, ..,S
0
n,k). Two agents are selected at random for a play
of the game each epoch t. Only the agents who played the game update their pri-
ors, and the outcome is not revealed to others. The stochastic process defined in
this way is a discrete-time Markov process on the nN dimensional state space of
priors.
2.1. Priors state space
Our main interest is in the probability density function (PDF) f (x, t) of agents
in the priors-space x = (x1, ..,xn), xi ≥ 0, where xi is the number of times (ac-
tual count, not the proportion) action i was played by an agent’s opponent. In
this space the straight lines through the origin represent the sets of the opponent’s
constant probabilities to play (s1, ..,sn), that is, the vector of empirical probabil-
ities is x/∑ j x j. For any subset Ω in the priors-space,
∫
Ω f (x, t)dx represents the
proportion of agents with their priors in the set Ω at time t. By BR = BR
(
x
∑ j x j
)
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we denote the best response (vector) function. We consider the generic case when
BR(x) takes on n values {ek}
n
k=1 of unit, basis vectors, away from a set of measure
zero. In large populations f (x, t) is well approximated by a bounded function (not
a distribution) and the value of the population mean best response
BR(t) =
∫
BR
(
x
∑ j x j
)
f (x, t)dx (2)
does not depend on the values of BR on the exceptional set.
Our main interest is in describing the changes in f (x, t) in the process of learn-
ing and analyzing its asymptotic behavior. Here, the main numerical characteris-
tics are the vector of mean empirical probabilities
Λ(t) =
∫
x
∑ j x j
f (x, t)dx,
and the mean best response vector BR(t).
The following equation is found (see Appendix) to be the leading order ap-
proximation of the stochastic learning process, when the number of players is
large and the learning increment h is small.
∂ f
∂ t
+div(u(x, t) f ) = 0, (3)
with velocity u given by the formula
u(x, t) = BR(t)−µx. (4)
We will refer to equations (2), (3), and (4) as the PDE model of the fictitious
play learning. To complete the description of the model we will prescribe zero
boundary conditions for function f . Because the domain xi ≥ 0, i = 1..n, is invari-
ant under the flow of (4), the problem is correctly posed (not over-determined).
Notice also that the problem is non-linear: the “conservation of mass” equation (3)
carries the density f with velocity u(x, t) which, in its turn, depends on function
f .
2.2. Numerical test
In this section we compare the solution of the PDE model for a 2x2 game
with a mixed Nash equilibrium, given in Table 1, with the direct simulation of the
learning process.
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Figure 1: Distribution of priors. Uniform distribution on the unit box (shown in red) is predicted by
the PDEmodel. The center of the box, point (12,001,12,001), corresponds to the Nash equilibrium
in the game. Data points are priors from learning in the population of N=1000 agents in a single
run of the model for 40000 iterations. At time t = 0 distribution of priors is uniform on a box
[0,1]× [3,4] (not shown).
We take the initial data f0 is the density of uniform distribution of initial priors
in the box B = [0,1]× [3,4]. The number of agents is N = 1000 and the learning
increment is h = 0.001. The memory factor is set to zero. The game has a sin-
gle mixed Nash equilibrium (1/2,1/2). We consider the state of the learning at
time t = 20 when the learning settles near the equilibrium. By formula (8) this
corresponds to 20N/(2h) = 1000/h iterations of the game.
Recall that at all times the solution of the PDE is an uniform distribution on a
box of side-length 1, and only the coordinates of the center of the box, xc, need to
be computed. We use the explicit Euler method for the ODE
dxc
dt
= BR(t) =
∫
B(xc)
BR
(
x
∑ j x j
)
dx,
and find that at t = 20, xc = (12.001,12.001), see Figure 1. We compare it with
the data points that are the priors of 1000 agents after 1000/h random plays. At
time t = 0, the priors of agents had been selected from an uniform distribution on
the box B. The figure shows good agreement of the PDE model with the actual
learning process.
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2.3. Relation to the Best Response Dynamics (BRD) equation
Using equation (3), one can compute the equation for the mean empirical fre-
quencies vector Λ(t) :
dΛi
dt
=
∫
1
∑ j x j
(
BRi(t)−
xi
∑ j x j
)
f (x, t)dx, i = 1..n, (5)
since ∑ jBR j(t) = 1. Note, that the memory factor µ does not explicitly enter the
equation for Λ . It does, however, contributes to the dynamics of the distribution
f .
If one postulates that all agents have the same, or approximately the same,
priors
x(t) = (x1(t), ..,xn(t)), (6)
then f (x, t) is concentrated near x(t) and the above equation reduces to a variant
of the best response dynamics equation:
dΛi
dt
=
1
∑ j x j(t)
(
B˜Ri(Λ)−Λi
)
, i = 1..n. (7)
In this equation B˜R is “a regularization” of the best response function BR over the
support of function f (x, t). If the latter converges to a delta mass, B˜R converges
to a value of BR(Λ). Notice, also, the positive factor on the right-hand side of the
equation. For a learning processes in which priors become large, the learning rate
slows down. The learning factor corresponds to the factor t−1 in BRD equation in
Fudenberg & Levine (1998).
Hypothesis (6) can be replaced with a weaker one, by requiring that the em-
pirical probabilities x(t)/(∑ j x j) in the support of f (x, t) are nearly constant. The
extent to which this hypothesis or (6) are consistent with the dynamics of (3) is
limited only to the case when u(x, t) has a single, asymptotically stable fixed point,
or the support of f is bounded but it is carried by the velocity to large values of
|x|, so that the empirical probabilities inside the support are nearly constant. The
former condition holds for the model with a memory factor µ > 0, and latter for
the model with µ = 0.
2.4. Fictitious play with memory factor
In this and the following sections we will assume that the problem (2)–(4) has
a unique, regular solution with a generic initial data f (x,0) = f0(x), the fact that
can be proved by standard PDE techniques. To start with the qualitative analysis
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of the model with µ > 0, notice that the velocity is a simple linear function of x,
and for all i, ∂xiu(x, t) = −µ < 0. A flow of this type compresses the support of
f (the set where f is positive) toward a point, the position of which, in general,
changes. Notice also that each component ui(x, t) becomes negative when xi is
sufficiently large. This means that the learning takes place in the bounded region
of the priors space. After some transient time, all mass of f is concentrated near a
point and the dynamics is approximated by equation (7), where the factor 1/∑ j x j
is larger than some fixed positive number. The asymptotic behavior is determined
by the BRD equation (7). In the presence of a dominant strategy, the solution of
the PDE model will converge to a delta mass concentrated at a boundary point,
located on the boundary set {x : xi = 0}, corresponding to the dominant strategy
si.
For symmetric games with the payoff matrix A = {ai j}
n
i, j=1, such that the
quadratic form x ·Ax is strictly concave on a strategy simplex
∆ =
{
x : xi ≥ 0, i = 1..n,∑
i
xi = 1
}
,
Hofbauer (2009) showed that solutions of BRD (or smoothed BRD) equation con-
verge to a unique Nash equilibrium. With marginal modifications one can show
that solutions of (7) converge to a unique Nash equilibrium as well. Combined
with the fact the support of f converges to a point, we conclude that for all agents
will have the same vector of the equilibrium empirical probabilities.
We stress again that above arguments are based on the leading order approx-
imation of the stochastic learning process. The next order is the drift-diffusion
equation (14) from Appendix. In that model, the outcome of the learning will be a
stationary distribution of small deviation of order h around the Nash equilibrium.
2.5. Fictitious play with zero memory factor µ = 0
In this case the velocity u(x, t) is uni-directional: u(x, t) = BR(t). The initial
profile of the probability distribution f0(x) is simply carried by the velocity and
its shape doesn’t change. All components of velocity BR(t) are non-negative and
|BR(t)| ≥ n−1, as can be seen from formula (2). With such velocity f is moved
away from the origin at non-vanishing speed.
Suppose that at t = 0, f0 is an arbitrary distribution on a box B of side-length
a. After time t, f (x, t) is given by the same distribution on a box that is located,
approximately, t/n units away from the origin. For large t the vector of empiri-
cal frequencies x/∑ j x j is approximately constant in the ball (with deviations of
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order at−1), effectively rendering it as a single point. The dynamics can now be
computed from the equation (7), in which the learning factor (∑ j x j)
−1 is of the
order t−1. Under the strict concavity of on the expected payoff x ·Ax, the vector
of average empirical frequencies will converge to a unique Nash equilibrium.
2.6. Equation for the mean best response: a 2x2 game
Equation (7) and the BRD equation of Gilboa & Matsui (1991) are the equa-
tions for the population averaged empirical probabilities. Another important char-
acteristic of a learning process is the average strategy played at time t. In this
section we show on a simple example that PDE model (3) can be used to derive
the equation for BR(t). Consider the game in Table 1 and FP learning model with
zero memory factor µ = 0.We will take initial distribution of priors to be uniform
on some box. As was mentioned earlier, the learning dynamics (the leading order)
transports the initial distribution f0 with uni-directional velocity BR(t). If at time
t the support of f (x, t) is completely contained in the wedge x1 > x2 (or x2 > x1),
the velocity is constant (0,1)t (or (1,0)t). This type of velocity moves f0 towards
the line x1 = x2.When the support of f (x, t) intersects that line, we denote by l(t)
the length of segment of intersection, and by multiplying (3) by function BR and
integrating over the whole domain we obtain the following first order system of
ODEs for BR(t) :
dBR
dt
= l(t)
[
−1 1
1 −1
]
BR.
Assuming that after some transient time, l(t)> l0> 0, by changing to the new time
variable (still labeled t), the system is reduced to the constant coefficient case. We
find that there are eigenvalues: λ = 0,−2 and the corresponding eigenvectors:
(1/2,1/2)t and (−1/2,1/2)t. This implies that asymptotically,
BR(t) =
[
1/2
1/2
]
+O(e−2t).
Mean population best reply strategy approaches the mixed Nash equilibrium.
With this information at hand, we can use equation (5), and by estimating the
learning factor ∑ j x j by t, obtain the following equation for the mean empirical
probabilities Λ :
dΛ
dt
≈
1
t
(
BR(t)−Λ
)
.
By solving it, we conclude that limΛ(t) = (1/2,1/2)t.
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The arguments leading to the convergence of Λ(t) and BR(t) to the Nash
equilibrium can be repeated for a generic 2x2 symmetric game. Let the payoffs
for actions (L,L), (R,L), (L,R), (R,R) be (a,a), (c,d), (d,c), (b,b), respectively,
with a < c, b < d. The following theorem holds.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the initial distribution of agents in the priors space is
described by a smooth function f0 with compact support in the open quadrant
x1 > 0, x2 > 0. Let f (x, t) be the unique solution of the problem (2)–(4). Then,
the mean empirical probabilities, Λ(t), and the mean best response vector, BR(t),
converge as t → ∞ to the unique, mixed Nash equilibrium.
3. Appendix: Fokker-Planck equation
Consider a group of N individuals acting according to FP learning rule de-
scribed in section 2 in a symmetric game. For the simplicity of the presenta-
tion, we restrict ourselves only to the case of two pure strategies {s1,s2}. The
model with n strategies is written down at the end of the Appendix. Denote
X ti = (S
t
1,i,S
t
2,i), the vector of counts of opponent’s plays of s1 and s2 for agent
i, up to epoch t. By X t = (X t1, ..,X
t
N) we denote the vector of counts for all agents.
By wh(x¯, t), where x ∈ [0,1]
2N, we denote PDF for distribution of X t . We will
write x¯ = (x1, ..,xN), where each xi = (s1,i,s2,i). The best response of agent i will
be denoted as λi = BRi (xi/(s1,i + s2,i)) . Suppose that agents i and j are selected
for the interaction. There will be only one game played during the period from t
to t +δ .
We consider the learning rule (1) in which the priors are incremented by h >
0, that is, Ii,k is either h or 0. Since the best response function depends on the
empirical probabilities rather than on priors, the magnitude of the increment is
irrelevant, apart from the fact that for smaller increments the initial data influence
the dynamics for longer periods of time. The memory factor in (1) is set to µh,
with 0≤ µh≤ 1. The games are arranged to be played at time periods of length δ
determined as
δ =
2h
N
. (8)
If T is a time scale of learning process (in arbitrary units), then T/δ is the number
of rounds of the games needed to be played to observe changes at this time scale.
All games are played between two agents, thus, on average an agent plays T/(δN)
times during an interval length T.
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Conditioned on the event X t = x¯, the agents priors for the next period are set
according to formulas
X t+δi =

((1−µh)s1,i +h, (1−µh)s2,i) Prob= λiλj
((1−µh)s1,i, (1−µh)s2,i +h) Prob= λi(1−λj)
((1−µh)s1,i +h, (1−µh)s2,i) Prob= (1−λi)λj
((1−µh)s1,i, (1−µh)s2,i +h) Prob= (1−λi)(1−λj)
and symmetrically for X t+δj . For all other agents, X
t+δ
k = X
t
k for k 6= i, j. The defi-
nition of X t makes it a discrete-timeMarkov process. We proceed by writing down
the integral form of the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations and approximate its so-
lution by a solution of the Fokker-Planck equation (forward Kolmogorov’s equa-
tion), for small values of δ ,h and large N. This is a classic approach to stochastic
processes, the details of which can be found in Feller’s (1957) monograph.
The change of wh(x¯, t) from t to t +δ , can be described in the following way.∫
φ(x¯)wh(x¯, t +δ )dx¯ = E[φ(X
t+h)]
= ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫ (
λiλ jφ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i+h,(1−µh)s2,i)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j+h,(1−µh)s2, j)
+λi(1−λ j)φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i,(1−µh)s2,i+h)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j+h,(1−µh)s2, j)
+(1−λi)λ jφ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i+h,(1−µh)s2,i)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j ,(1−µh)s2, j+h)
+(1−λi)(1−λ j)φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i,(1−µh)s2,i+h)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j ,(1−µh)s2, j+h)
)
wh(x¯, t)dx¯. (9)
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This equation can be written in slightly different way:∫
φ(x¯)wh(x¯, t +δ )dx¯ =
∫
φ(x¯)wh(x, t)dx¯
+ ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫ (
λiλ j[φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i+h,(1−µh)s2,i)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j+h,(1−µh)s2, j )
−φ(x¯)]
+λi(1−λ j)[φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i,(1−µh)s2,i+h)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j+h,(1−µh)s2, j)
−φ(x¯)]
+(1−λi)λ j[φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i+h,(1−µh)s2,i)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j ,(1−µh)s2, j+h)
−φ(x¯)]
+(1−λi)(1−λ j)[φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i,(1−µh)s2,i+h)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j ,(1−µh)s2, j+h)
−φ(x¯)]
)
wh(x¯, t)dx¯. (10)
Denote the PDF of the distribution by
fh(x, t) = ∑
k
N−1
∫
wh(x¯)
∣∣
xk=x
dx¯k, x ∈ R
2,
where x¯k is a 2N−2 dimensional vector of all coordinates, excluding xk. In statis-
tical physics this function is also called one-particle distribution. In the formulas
to follow we need to use two-particle distribution function
gh(x,y, t) = ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫
wh(x¯)
∣∣
xi=x,x j=y
dx¯i j,
where x¯i j is the 2N−4 dimensional vector of all coordinated excluding xi and x j.
Function gh is symmetric in (x,y) and is related to fh by the formulas
fh(x, t) =
∫
gh(x,y, t)dx =
∫
gh(x,y, t)dy.
The moments of function fh and gh are computed from the moment of wh :∫
ψ(x) fh(x, t)dx = ∑
k
N−1
∫
ψ(xk)wh(x¯)dx¯,
and ∫
ω(x,y)gh(x,y, t)dxdy = ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫
ω(xi,x j)wh(x¯)dx¯.
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This follows from the definition of these functions.
Now we use (10) to obtain an integral equation of the change of function fh.
For that select φ(x¯) = ψ(xk), sum over k and take average. We get∫
ψ(x) fh(x, t +δ )dx =
∫
ψ(x) fh(x, t)dx
+N−1 ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫ (
λiλ j[ψ((1−µh)s1,i +h, (1−µh)s2,i)−ψ(xi)
+ψ((1−µh)s1, j +h, (1−µh)s2, j)−ψ(x j)]
+λi(1−λ j)[ψ((1−µh)s1,i, (1−µh)s2,i +h)−ψ(xi)
+ψ((1−µh)s1, j +h, (1−µh)s2, j)−ψ(x j)]
+(1−λi)λ j[ψ((1−µh)s1,i +h, (1−µh)s2,i)−ψ(xi)
+ψ((1−µh)s1, j, (1−µh)s2, j +h)−ψ(x j)]
+(1−λi)(1−λ j)[ψ((1−µh)s1,i, (1−µh)s2,i +h)−ψ(xi)
+ψ((1−µh)s1, j, (1−µh)s2, j +h)−ψ(x j)]
)
wh(x¯, t)dx¯. (11)
The right-hand side can be conveniently expressed in terms of the two-particle
function gh :
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∫
ψ(x) fh(x, t +δ )dx =
∫
ψ(x) fh(x, t)dx
+N−1
∫
(λ (x)λ (y)[ψ((1−µh)sx1+h, (1−µh)s
x
2)−ψ(x)
+ψ((1−µh)sy1+h, (1−µh)s
y
2)−ψ(y)]
+λ (x)(1−λ (y))[ψ((1−µh)sx1, (1−µh)s
x
2+h)−ψ(x)
+ψ((1−µh)sy1+h, (1−µh)s
y
2)−ψ(y)]
+(1−λ (x))λ (y)[ψ((1−µh)sx1+h, (1−µh)s
x
2)−ψ(x)
+ψ((1−µh)sy1, (1−µh)s
y
2+h)−ψ(y)]
+(1−λ (x))(1−λ (y))[ψ((1−µh)sx1, (1−µh)s
x
2+h)−ψ(x)
+ψ((1−µh)s
y
1, (1−µh)s
y
2+h)−ψ(y)]
)
gh(x,y, t)dxdy. (12)
where x = (sx1,s
x
2), y = (s
y
1,s
y
2), and λ (x) = s
x
1/(s
x
1+ s
x
2), and similar for λ (y). In
the processes with large number of agents and random binary interactions, two-
particle distribution function can be factored into two independent distributions:
gh(x,y, t) = fh(x, t) fh(y, t).
With this relation, (12), becomes a family of non-linear integral relations for the
next time step distribution fh(x, t+δ ). Selecting time step proportional to h so that
2h
δN
∼ 1, and taking Taylor expansions up to the second order for the increment of
the test function ψ, we obtain the following Fokker-Planck equation
∂ f
∂ t
+div(u(x, t) f )−h ∑
i, j=1,2
∂ 2xix j
(
di j f
)
= 0, (13)
where x= (x1,x2), x1,x2> 0 and the drift velocity is given by the formula u(x, t)=
BR(t)−µx, where
BR(t) =
∫
BR
(
x
x1+ x2
)
f (x, t)dx.
di j are elements of a symmetric, positive definite diffusion matrix D computed by
the formula:
D=BR1(t)(µx1−1,µx2)⊗(µx1−1,µx2)+BR2(t)(µx1,µx2−1)⊗(µx1,µx2−1).
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Consider now the learning from playing a symmetric game with n pure strate-
gies. Denote the priors vector x = (x1, ..,xn). Then, the Fokker-Planck equation
approximating the stochastic learning is
∂ f
∂ t
+div(u(x, t) f )−h ∑
i, j=1..n
∂ 2xix j
(
di j f
)
= 0, (14)
u(x, t) = BR(t)−µx, where
BR(t) =
∫
BR
(
x
∑ j x j
)
f (x, t)dx.
di j are elements of a symmetric, positive definite diffusion matrix D computed by
the formula:
D = ∑
i
BRi(t)(µx− ei)⊗ (µx− ei).
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